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LIBERATING RADIO: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES' RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
INTRODUCTION
Federal regulation regarding the content of radio programming is pre-
mised on the concept that the airwaves are a limited public resource, one
which requires certain controls so that all voices clamoring for attention can
be heard. The rationale for such regulation was initially based on the scarce
number of stations and the pervasive influence of broadcasting on a captive
audience.' With technological advances and the increased number of sta-
tions, the parameters of federal regulation have required refinement. Thus,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) promul-
gated two policy statements advocating the deregulation of both the en-
tertainment and nonentertainment portions of radio.
2
In 1976, after issuing a notice and inquiry, the FCC formulated a policy
statement which announced that it would let the free market dictate the
types of formats radio stations would have for their entertainment program-
ming. In essence, the FCC promoted the deregulation of entertainment for-
mats by choosing not to regulate the broadcasters' program choices.
Through this deregulation, the FCC endorsed the principle that the public
interest in diversity of entertainment formats would be best served by a com-
petitive marketplace and not by governmental regulation. 3
In FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild,4 the Supreme Court decided that the
FCC could, consonant with the public interest, promote the goal of diversity
in radio programming through the free competition policy. This decision set
aside the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' "format" doctrine 5 which
rejected the FCC's authority to totally deregulate radio entertainment pro-
gramming through the marketplace. According to the format doctrine, if
there is significant public grumbling concerning a proposed change in pro-
1. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
2. The FCC's deregulation policy actions are only applicable to the radio industry, not to
television broadcasting.
3. This deregulation action is in accord with the new presidential strategy of deregulating
America's industries. President Reagan has charged that "[g]overnment regulations impose an
enormous burden on large and small business in America, discourage productivity, and contrib-
ute substantially to our current economic woes .... It is my intention to curb the size and
influence of the federal establishment." Bus. WEEK, Mar. 9, 1981, at 62.
Professor Gellhorn does not agree that the current mood of Congress and the nation favor-
ing deregulation is necessarily desirable. Professor Gellhorn suggests instead that the adminis-
trative agency decision-makers should be more responsible. He characterizes deregulation as a
"dangerous political slogan" that encourages reckless overhauling instead of fine tuning. Gell-
horn, Deregulation: Delight or Delusion?, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 469, 482 (1980).
4. 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
5. The format doctrine is a judicially created principle developed by the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals. The doctrine is applicable to "unique" entertainment programming.
For example, a radio station offering classical music would be considered to have presented a
unique program if it were the only station in the community playing classical music. WNCN
Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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gramming, the FCC must consider, usually in an administrative hearing,
whether the public interest is served by the change. 6 Thus, the court of
appeals reasoned, when the marketplace regulation goes awry, the govern-
ment must intervene in the public interest.7 The Supreme Court upheld the
FCC's contention that even in a format controversy, no government inter-
vention is necessary.
8
In WNCN, the Supreme Court accorded substantial judicial deference
to the FCC's rulemaking authority. The rationale of the decisions comports
with the Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary and capricious" 9 stan-
dard for the scope of judicial review of an administrative agency's action.
Recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had advocated a
stricter scrutiny of administrative action by the judiciary.' 0 In rejecting a
stricter scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court reasoned that an agency could
best decide how to carry out the goals of its enabling statute as long as there
was a rational basis for its methods. Because it accords such judicial defer-
ence to an agency, the WNCN decision has vast implications on the scope of
idirial review of administrative agencies' rulemaking authority."
In February 1981, the FCC, continuing its deregulation policy, promul-
gated a final rule deregulating certain nonentertainment portions of radio
broadcasting.' 2 Under the Deregulation Policy Statement, the broadcaster
must now meet only generalized public interest obligations "in light of the
contemporary reality of the radio marketplace."'
3
This note will analyze and critique the underlying rationale of WNCN
and explore the potential reach of the decision as it relates to the Deregula-
tion Policy Statement.
I. DEREGULATION THROUGH THE COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE
A. The PUb/ic Interest Standard of Diversity in Entertainment Programming
The Communications Act of 193414 established the Federal Communi-
cations Commission to regulate the burgeoning radio industry. The powers
given to the FCC were broad: to regulate the allocation of broadcast fre-
quencies, to grant applications for radio licenses, to renew radio licenses, and
to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public inter-
est."' 5 This public interest charge set the tenor for the FCC's administrative
control. For example, before granting an application for a radio license or
renewing a radio license, the FCC must determine that to do so would serve
the "public interest, necessity, and convenience."'
6
6. See notes 26-44 nfzra and accompanying text.
7. 610 F.2d 838, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
8. 450 U.S. at 593-97.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
10. See notes 125-149 infra.
11. See notes 133-154 t'nf:a and accompanying text.
12. 46 Fed. Reg. 13888 (1981) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. Pts. 0, 73).
13. 46 Fed. Reg. at 13888.
14. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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The definition of "public interest" includes the goal of promoting diver-
sity in radio entertainment programming. The term diversity, as used in the
radio entertainment context, means program formats of all types of music,
news, and public affairs.
1 7
Historically, this goal of diversity in radio programming was met by the
broadcasters without intervention from the FCC. In the early days of radio
broadcasting, when large numbers of Americans lived in areas with only one
or two radio stations, the stations promoted the diversity goal by providing a
general variety of entertainment selections.' 8 With the vast increase in the
number of stations over the years, however, broadcasters have specialized
their entertainment formats. 19 Thus, the implementation of the diversity
goal has shifted from the single radio station providing a variety of selections
to a number of stations each offering different formats.
Throughout the history of radio, broadcasters have selected and
changed their entertainment formats without interference from the public.
Although the Communications Act provided that the airwaves were dedi-
cated for the public benefit, the listening public did not have standing to
question the FCC's public interest determinations in granting, renewing, or
transferring radio licenses. 20 The power to raise the public interest issue was
left, then, to the FCC and to the broadcasters. The broadcasters were con-
sidered to be representatives of the public interest, but the scope of their
interests was usually confined to the narrow questions of their financial losses
or electronic interference.
2 1
Not until the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' 1966 decision in
the Ojice of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,22 did the court
recognize the listening public's standing to participate in licensing decisions
involving the public interest issue. In United Church of Christ, the court of
appeals held that responsible associations have standing "not for the protec-
tion of their private interest, but only to vindicate the public interest."
'2 3
The rationale for this decision was, given the multitude of duties of the FCC
and the narrow interest of the broadcasters, it is unfeasible and inappropri-
ate to rely solely on the FCC and broadcasters to raise all public interest
questions that arise in a licensing proceeding. 24 The court concluded that
conferring standing to a public group to contest a public interest point
17. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
18. 46 Fed. Reg. at 13888. "[I]n the early days of radio, it was essential that a few stations
provide a broad general service." Id
19. Id The number of stations has increased from 583 stations in 1934 to almost 9000
stations in 1981. Id
20. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
21. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1940); accord, Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942). In Scripps-Howard, the Supreme Court held that
the Communications Act did not create new private rights. Standing is given then, to those
persons 'aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected' by the FCC's action. "But these
private litigants have standing only as representatives of the public interest." Id at 14. As such,
these parties with standing are authorized private attorney generals. See Associated Indus., Inc.
v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
22. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
23. Id at 1001.
24. Id at 1002.
19821
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would make the radio licensee more "responsive to the needs of the audience
"25
Although the differences in listening choices between the public and the
broadcasters may have always existed, it was not until after the United Church
of Christ decision that these differences became apparent. Thus, once this
right of standing was conferred, public interest groups began attacking the
traditional policy of allowing broadcasters the discretion to choose their own
entertainment programming. The public interest groups challenged broad-
casters who planned to abandon a unique program in favor of a more com-
mon format-for example, from classical music or jazz to top forty music.
These groups merged into a committee to petition the FCC to conduct a
hearing to review the licensee's application for transfer or renewal.
As provided by the Communications Act, the FCC would usually grant
a transfer application or a license renewal without the necessity of an admin-
istrative hearing, except if: 1) there were substantial and material questions
of fact concerning the transfer or 2) the FCC could not determine if the
i,' lotin mpt the nhlire interest, convenience. and necessity standard.
26
Despite the United Church of Christ decision and the Communications
Act's mandate, the FCC proved unresponsive to the public committee's peti-
tions for hearings. By appealing the FCC's decisions to the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals, the committees found a receptive judiciary that
would reverse the agency's decisions. The proper interpretation and imple-
mentation of the public interest diversity goal sparked the controversy be-
tween the FCC and the appellate court, culminating in the Supreme Court's
decision in WNCN. The crux of the disagreement focused on the judicially
espoused format doctrine.
B. The Format Doctrine--Government Intervention for Unique Programming
In the first of the format doctrine cases, Citiens Committee to Preserve the
"Voice of the Arts 'n Atlanta" v. FCC,2 7 controversy emerged when a citizens'
association, in a petition to deny a transfer application, complained that the
abandonment of a unique format by a prospective transferor of a radio li-
cense would have a serious negative impact on the public interest in diversity
of entertainment programming. 28 The proposed transfer in this case in-
volved a change of format from classical music to "easy listening."
'29
25. Id
26. Under the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1976) any party in interest
may petition the FCC to deny the application, and such petition "shall contain specific allega-
tions of fact sufficient to show. . . that a grant of the application would be prima facie inconsis-
tent with [the public interest standard]." Furthermore, subsection (d)(2) provides that if the
FCC finds that there are no "substantial and material questions of fact," then the petition will
be denied. If there are "substantial and material questions of fact," or "if the Commission for
any reason is unable to find that grant of the application would be consistent with [the public
interest standard]," then the FCC shall proceed with a public hearing pursuant to subsection
(e).
27. 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
28. Id at 268-69.
29. Id at 265. A survey of the area residents showed that 16% of the people in Atlanta
favored a classical music format. Id at 269.
[Vol. 59:3
LIBERATING RADIO
Notwithstanding the citizens' protest, the FCC granted the application with-
out a hearing. In overruling the FCC's decision, 30 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals mandated that the Commission must inquire into whether
the public interest would be harmed when a unique format is to be discon-
tinued. The court held that the question of alternative sources of program-
ming and profitability had met the threshold standard for a hearing under
the "substantial and material question" directive. Although the court's
opinion did not direct the Commission to dictate programming, the court
held that the FCC should discern "what are the community needs and will
they be properly served by the proposed transfer" 3 1 when a unique format
change is in issue.
In Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC,32 the court of appeals
further delineated the format doctrine. In this case, the existing station was
in financial straits. In an unsuccessful attempt to find a lucrative format, the
station had changed formats from country and western to "golden oldies."
The broadcaster then sought to assign his license. After the application for
transfer proceeding had begun, the station began to experiment with broad-
casting progressive rock music. Although this new format was an immediate
success, the prospective licensee planned to broadcast top forty sounds.
33
The Citizens Committee petitioned the FCC for a hearing on the format
question. 34  The FCC denied the request and granted the application.
Again, the court of appeals reversed. The court concluded that when public
grumbling reaches significant proportions, a substantial and material ques-
tion of fact exists which must be resolved by a hearing.35 The court also held
that the FCC must determine the extent of support by the area residents,
and then make a decision on the public interest based on substantial evi-
dence. 36 Additionally, the court addressed the question of the financial posi-
tion of the station transferring the license, and averred that the financial
condition of the station was not a direct factor in deciding if an assignment
should be granted. Rather, the FCC should consider "whether the format is
so economically unfeasible that an assignment encompassing a format
change should be granted.
3 7
30. Under the Communications Act, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has exclu-
sive appellate jurisdiction in broadcast licensing matters. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
31. 436 F.2d at 272 n.7.
32. 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
33. Id at 928.
34. The Citizens Committee was formed solely for the purpose of petitioning the FCC for a
denial of the application of the license transfer. This committee was thus complying with the
Uniltd Church of Christ case mandate of "responsible associations." See text accompanying notes
22-25 supra.
35. 478 F.2d at 934.
36. Id
37. Id. at 931. At the same time Progressive Rock was decided, the court ruled in Lakewood
Broadcasting Serv. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1973), that an all-news station was not a
"unique" format within the purview of the format doctrine. Noting that news was provided by
other radio stations and that two stations were "all news" during prime listening hours, the
court held that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate "material and substantial questions of
fact" necessary to invoke a hearing. Id at 924.
1982]
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In Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC,38 the court of appeals put
the final gloss on the format doctrine. Here, the FCC had granted the trans-
fer application of Chicago's primary classical music station, WEFM. The
FCC had specifically found that Chicago's two other classical music stations
served WEFM's service area and provided an adequate alternative for the
listening public. 39 Although the FCC's action was initially upheld by a
three-judge panel, 40 an en bane panel vacated this decision and reversed the
Commission's grant of the transfer, finding that the alternative sources of
programming were unacceptable substitutes.4 ' In the majority opinion, the
court of appeals characterized the format doctrine as a balance between the
public interest in diversity of formats and the broadcasters' business discre-
tion in choosing entertainment programming. The court stated that "if the
FCC is to pursue the public interest, it may not be able at the same time to
pursue a policy of free competition."
'42
The court of appeals outlined a procedure for the FCC to follow in
determining if it must intervene in a licensing proceeding and hold a hearing
on the change of entertainment formats. The court opined that when there
is significant public discontent over the abandonment of a unique format,
the FCC must first decide if the format is unique. If there are no alternate
sources of the same type of programming in the community, the format is
considered unique. Second, once the format is determined to be unique, a
hearing is required to consider the factual issue of whether the public interest
would be served by changing the format.43 As a caveat to this consideration,
the court asserted that the financial losses of a station could be considered, as
justification for granting the application transfer causing the loss of a unique
format, only when the financial losses are "attributable to the format itself
"44
C. The 1976 Polic Statement and WNCN-Advocating Deregulation through the
Competitive Marketplace
1. Notice of Inquiry
Faced with the directive of WEFM, the FCC decided to resolve the for-
mat doctrine controversy by administrative rulemaking and, therefore, is-
sued a Notice of Inquiry45 pursuant to its rulemaking authority.46 The
proceedings were to establish a comprehensive policy statement on the ap-
propriateness and feasibility of the agency's regulation of entertainment for-
mats. 47 This policy was to rest upon consideration of two issues: 1) whether
38. 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir.) vacated, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
39. Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223 (1973).
40. 506 F.2d at 252.
41. Id at 264-65.
42. Id at 267-68.
43. Id at 262.
44. Id
45. Notice of Inquiry, Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats
of Broadcast Stations, 57 F.C.C.2d 580 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Notice of Inquiry).
46. The FCC is authorized to undertake rulemaking as the "public convenience, interest,
or necessity requires." Communications Act of 1934, § 303, 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976).
47. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 45, at 584-85.
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the Communications Act of 1934 required, in the public interest, a "close
scrutiny of broadcast entertainment formats to assure an appropriate diver-
sity" and 2) whether the close scrutiny over broadcast program content was
permitted under the first amendment.48 The Commission posited that "any
administrative regulation or policy tending to constrain an applicant from
selecting programming of its choice 'must be justified by the existence and
immediate impendency of dangers to the public interest which clearly and
not dubiously outweigh those involved in the restrictions.' -49 Thus, accord-
ing to the FCC's prediction, a free, competitive marketplace would best ac-
complish the goal of promoting diversity in entertainment programming.
The Notice of Inquiry, however, was colored by the agency's opinion
that the directive of WEFM was unwarranted. The Commission was obvi-
ously disturbed by the role cast for it by the court, and stated: "[wie are
deeply concerned that, by rejecting the programming choices of individual
broadcasters in favor of a system of pervasive governmental regulation, the
Commission would embark on a course which may have serious adverse con-
sequences for the public interest." 50 In sum, the Commission viewed the
determination of the uniqueness of a format as requiring subjective decision-
making.5 ' Furthermore, it contended that the "uniqueness of a format" de-
termination would be unproductive since cumbersome governmental regula-
tion would be inferior, in achieving diversity of formats, to the decisions
made by the marketplace.
52
2. The 1976 Policy Statement
After receiving comments from interested parties and following public
notice and comment, 53 the FCC issued the Policy Statement. 54 The Policy
Statement underscored the Commission's adherence to its competitive mar-
ketplace regulation policy. Although recognizing that there may be in-
stances of marketplace failure, the FCC insisted that diversity could best be
achieved by free competition. The Commission rested its position on empiri-
48. Id. at 582.
49. Id at 585 (quoting United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948)).
50. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 45, at 582.
51. Commissioner Robinson summarized his views on the vexing problem facing the
agency in regulating entertainment program formats, noting the acute problems in adhering to
the mandate of the court of appeals:
The standard for "uniqueness" or "diversity"-the diversity that the public wants
enough so as to cause it to grumble when it is diminished-is obviously idiosyncratic
and subjective. Quite aside from the constitutional objections . . . this subjective ele-
ment presents intractable difficulties in administration. What makes one format
unique makes all formats unique. If subjectivity is to be an important determinant of
what makes a format "unique" (or, in other terms, what makes it a net contributor to
diversity), how are we to avoid the fact that even with respect to formats which objec-
tively seem identical, people-radio listeners-can and do make distinctions . ...
[B]y the subjective standards that the Court seems to embrace, any format is unique;
from which it follows, all must be preserved. At that thought the mind swims and the
heart sinks.
Id. at 594-95.
52. Id. at 582-83.
53. The FCC received more than fifty responses to its Notice of Inquiry.
54. Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Sta-
tions, 60 F.C.C. 2d 858 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Policy Statement).
1982]
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cal evidence, administrative difficulties, and constitutional considerations.5 5
The empirical evidence advanced in the Policy Statement showed the
wide variety of programming currently available. Moreover, the FCC noted
that this diversity had been achieved without any government regulation.
56
The FCC concluded that competition had provided a sufficient amount of
diversity in entertainment programming. Additionally, the FCC reasoned
that the market forces provide "a precious element of flexibility which no
system of regulatory supervision could possibly approximate."'5 7 When the
public taste in entertainment changes quickly, the agency contended, the
listening public has a right to expect broadcasters to change or alter their
programming to meet the new trend, without the delay of government
intervention.
Additionally, the Commission insisted that administrative problems
would require constant broadcaster surveillance and involve a cumbersome
hearing process to meet the standards prescribed in WEFM. According to
the Commission, these difficulties involved the determination of" 1. what the
station's existing format is; 2. whether thcse aic ainy rcanab. e ..........
for that format in the station's market; [and] 3. if there are not, whether the
benefits accruing to the public from the format change outweigh the public
detriment which the format abandonment would entail."
58
Finally, the FCC speculated that the governmental intervention involv-
ing the threat of a hearing might have a "chilling effect" on the broadcasters
experimenting with entertainment programming that would injure the pub-
lic interest. The Commission found that an obligation on the part of the
broadcaster to continue an unwanted format would deprive "the public of
the best efforts of the broadcast industry and [would result] in an inhibition
of constitutionally protected forms of communication with no off-setting jus-
tifications, either in terms of specific First Amendment or diversity-related
values or in broader public interest terms."
5 9
In advancing these arguments, the FCC relied on the Supreme Court's
reasoning in FCC . Sanders Brothers Radio Staton.6° In Sanders Brothers the
Court opined that "broadcasters are not common carriers and are not to be
dealt with as such. The [Communications] Act recognized that the field of
broadcasting is one of free competition." 61 Echoing this concept, the FCC
concluded in the Policy Statement that the right of competition among
broadcasters should be recognized. In essence, the FCC posited that the only
means by which broadcasters can compete for a listening audience and ad-
55. Id
56. The Commission relied on its own staff survey and on a study prepared by Professor
Owen of Stanford University. Policy Statement, app. B, at 873.
57. Id. at 864.
58. Id. at 861-62.
59. Id at 865.
60. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
61. Id at 474. The Court further held that "Congress intended to leave competition in the
business of broadcasting where it found it, to permit a licensee who was not interfering electri-
cally with other broadcasters to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his pro-
grams attractive to the public." Id at 475.
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vertising sponsors is by what they air as their entertainment format.6 2
3. WNCN-The District of Columbia Court of Appeals Decision
The dichotomy between the Policy Statement and the format doctrine
prompted a decisive response from the cou'rt of appeals. Citizens' groups
petitioned the court to set aside the FCC's Policy Statement on the ground
that it was an abdication of authority by the agency. The court of appeals,
sitting en banc,63 struck down the Policy Statement in WNCNListeners Guild v.
FCC,64 reasoning that it did not comport with the rule articulated in
WEFM.
The court of appeals vacated the Policy Statement, using the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act's criteria for judicial review. 65 First, the court ruled
that the FCC had overstepped its bounds in construing the statutory com-
mand of "public interest." Second, it held that the Commission's decision
was arbitrary and caprious. 66 Additionally, the court stated that the Com-
mission's failure to release an internal staff study for public comment vio-
lated the public's right to comment on the Notice of Inquiry. Since the court
found the first two reasons compelling, however, it did not set aside the Pol-
icy Statement on the third ground.
6 7
In WNCN, the appellate court restated the basic premise of its format
doctrine "that the Communications Act's 'public interest, convenience, and
necessity' standard includes a concern for diverse entertainment program-
ming." 68 Congress had "set aside the radio spectrum" to benefit " 'all the
people' of our richly pluralistic society," not simply "those in the cultural
mainstream. '69 Accordingly, the court concluded that Congress intended,
in adopting the general "public interest, convenience, and necessity" stan-
dard of the Communications Act, that "all major aspects of contemporary
culture . . . be accommodated by the commonly-owned public resources
whenever that is technically and economically feasible."
' 70
Furthermore, the court of appeals asserted that the Commission had
misread the directive of WEFM. According to the court, WEFM did not
require hearings in all applications involving license transfers or renewals,
only in those applications seeking abandonment of a unique format. 7i It is
not necessary to make a public interest determination if parties challenging
62. Policy Statement, supra note 54, at 864-65.
63. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court sat en
bane because no panel of the court could overrule the en bane holding in WEFM.
64. 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 852 (1981).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (1976).
66. 610 F.2d at 846-51.
67. Id
68. Id at 842.
69. Id (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17, (1943)).
70. 610 F.2d at 842.
71. Id at 850. The court stated that the Commission had analyzed WEFM as "the antith-
esis of the free market," since it mandated a " 'system of pervasive governmental regulation,'
requiring 'comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance.' Having framed its
analysis in Manichaean terms, it is not surprising that the Commission found numerous flaws in




an application fail to meet threshold standards. Those standards include a
lack of public outcry, an adequate radio station format substitution, a mini-
mal number of devotees, and financial infeasibility. 72 Recognizing "that
market forces do generally provide diversification of formats,"7 3 the court
averred that the ,WFM hearing requirement was necessary "only when
there is strong prima facie evidence that the market has in fact broken
down." 74 Although the court also stated the FCC had discretion to set stan-
dards which would minimize the administrative difficulties, it still charged
the agency with the responsibility of adhering to the format doctrine.
75
4. WNCN-The Supreme Court Reverses
The FCC appealed the court of appeals' decision to the Supreme Court,
seeking reversal on all grounds. The Supreme Court faced the questions of
the proper responsibility of the FCC in accomplishing the goal of promoting
diversity in entertainment formats and the concomitant responsibility of the
court of appeals in reviewing the administrative decisions. After tracing the
facts contributing iu ae ,wuiztrver.3y, the Supreme Ccu- reer,td th'? rnhlrt
of appeals' decision and endorsed the FCC's Policy Statement. 76 The
Supreme Court's analysis of the conflict between the agency and the court of
appeals revolved around two basic concepts of the scope of judicial review of
administrative agencies: 1) that "the construction of a statute by those
charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling
indications that it is wrong";7 7 and 2) when Congress has given the agency
broad discretion to determine the best methods of achieving the goals of the
agency's enabling statute, courts should decline to substitute their views for
the views of the agency.
78
In this decision, the Supreme Court accorded substantial judicial defer-
ence to the FCC's decision-making. The Court stated that the Commission
had discretion in deciding the methods to be used in furthering the public
interest goals of the Communications Act; such methods could include
adopting the policy of using free competition to promote diversity in en-
tertainment programming. 79 The Commission had provided a rational basis
for its reliance on the competitive market forces as the best method of pro-
moting the public interest in diversity in entertainment programming, and
had properly weighed "the benefits and the harm likely to flow from govern-
ment review of entertainment programming"80 in reaching its conclusion.
Therefore, the Court maintained that the Commission was properly within
its realm of competence in relying on the market place to satisfy the listening
preferences of the public.8 '
72. Id at 851.
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id at 852-54.
76. 450 U.S. at 596.
77. Id at 598 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)).
78. Set text accompanying notes 134-159 bfzra.
79. 450 U.S. at 593-95.
80. Id at 595.
81. Id at 600.
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Additionally, the Court held that the Commission's Policy Statement
was consonant with the Communications Act's goal of promoting the public
interest through diversity in programming while preserving journalistic dis-
cretion by avoiding unnecessary restrictions on licensee discretion.8 2 Be-
cause the FCC's policy was neither inconsistent with the legislative history of
the Act 83 nor an improper interpretation of the statute,84 the Court ruled
that the court of appeals should not have vacated the Commission's regula-
tions. Accordingly, the Court reprimanded the court of appeals for violating
the judicial deference doctrine in reviewing the FCC's decisions, while initi-
ating the format doctrine in 1970.85 The Supreme Court insinuated that in
formulating the format doctrine, the court of appeals necessarily engaged in
its own policy making and, thus, substituted its views for the views of the
agency.
8 6
II. CRITIQUE OF THE RATIONALE IN WNCN
A. The Public Interest Standard
As indicated by the Supreme Court, a court reviewing an administra-
tive agency's statutory construction of its own enabling act should uphold
the agency's construction unless there are compelling indications that it is
wrong. The FCC, in its Policy Statement, interpreted the public interest
standard as allowing free marketplace competition to provide diversity in
radio entertainment programming. In examining the correctness of this in-
terpretation, construction of the public interest standard involves three basic
inquiries: the statutory definition of "public interest" as provided by the
Communications Act; the legislative history of the statute; and the history of
the agency's interpretation and implementation of the public interest
standard.
1. The Statutory Definition of "Public Interest"
The court of appeals' and Supreme Court's analysis of the statutory
definition of "public interest" is a contrast between judicial interpretative
expansion and judicial literalism. The court of appeals' definition in the
Voice of the Arts in Atlanta case, the first format case, is limited to the state-
ment that "it is surely in the public interest .. . for all major aspects of
contemporary culture to be accommodated by the commonly-owned public
resources whenever that is technically and economically feasible." '8 7 This
82. Id at 596.
83. The Court stated:
As we read the legislative history of the Act, Congress did not unequivocally express its
disfavor of entertainment format review by the Commission, but neither is there sub-
stantial indication that Congress expected the public-interest standard to require for-
mat regulation by the Commission. The legislative history of the Act does not support
the Court of Appeals and provides insufficient basis for invalidating the agency's con-
struction of the Act.
Id at 597-98 (emphasis in the original).
84. d at 596.
85. Id at 597-600.
86. Id
87. 436 F.2d at 269.
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conclusion was based on that portion of the Communications Act8 8 which
states that prior to granting an application for a license, the FCC must con-
sider if the grant would be in the public interest. In the Voice of the Arts in
Atlanta decision, there is no further analysis of "public interest. '"89
In WEFM, the second format case, the appellate court buttressed its
definition of public interest with the Supreme Court's decision in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States,9° in which the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he
avowed aim of the Communications Act of 1934 was to secure the maximum
benefits of radio to all the people." 9' Reasoning that this statement sup-
ported the format doctrine, the court of appeals further reiterated its posi-
tion that some government intervention is necessary in radio entertainment
programming. The court stated "[t]he very fact that Congress has seen fit to
enter into comprehensive regulation . .. contradicts the notion that na-
tional policy unqualifiedly favors competition in communications.
9 2
The general statement taken from the Supreme Court's decision in Na-
tional Broadcasting, however, does not explicitly require the FCC to regulate
entertainment formats and does noi bupoit the, . I... t ha the PFlCr
may never rely entirely on competition to regulate a particular aspect of
radio broadcasting. If the maximum benefits of radio can be secured to all
people through the Commission's reliance on unrestrained competition,
there is nothing in the express "public interest" language prohibiting such
reliance. The statutory language does not limit the means that the FCC
may employ to further the public interest policy. Using the same language
from the statute as did the court of appeals, the FCC found that governmen-
tal regulation was not necessary, even in the format doctrine situation.
9 3
In construing the public interest standard, the Supreme Court in
WNCN agreed with the FCC. The Court recognized that the "public inter-
est" standard is not a defined term in the Communications Act.94 Hence,
since the literal terms of the Act do not require the Commission to regulate
entertainment formats, the Supreme Court, in overruling the court of ap-
peals' decision, averred that the Commission had broad discretion to deter-
mine how best "to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all of the people
of the United States."95 As a result, the Commission's construction of the
Communications Act "should be followed unless there are compelling indi-
cations that it is wrong." The Court opined that the FCC had provided a
rational basis for choosing to avoid governmental interference with the pro-
gramming discretion of radio broadcasters by allowing the competitive mar-
ketplace to promote diversity. This conclusion is especially cogent in view of
88. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976).
89. See note 29 supra.
90. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
91. 506 F.2d at 267 (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. at 217).
92. 506 F.2d at 267 (quoting FCC v. RCA Corn., Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 93 (1953)).
93. 450 U.S. at 604.
94. Id at 593.
95. I at 594 (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. at 217).
96. Id at 598 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 381).
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the fact that the Court was affirming the status quo of entertainment pro-
gramming prior to the format cases.
2. Legislative History
Since the express language of the public interest standard does not limit
the methods that the FCC may use in promoting the larger and more effec-
tive use of radio, the inquiry next turns to whether the legislative history of
the Communications Act provides any insight on the use of free competition
to regulate radio entertainment programming. The legislative history of the
Communications Act establishes that Congress did not intend an allocation
scheme based on program categories.9 7 An allocation scheme would set
aside some radio frequencies for exclusive broadcasting of special entertain-
ment formats.
In formulating the first radio legislation, Congress considered whether a
preference should be given to prospective licensees who would broadcast sa-
cred music instead of jazz. The promoter of this idea believed that "some
provision should be made to afford a better and more wholesome set of pro-
grams than sometimes exist."'9 8 In rejecting this idea as a form of censor-
ship, 99 Congress intended that each licensee be allowed to select the type of
programming to be broadcast.'
00
The more narrow focus of the format doctrine, however, is not ad-
dressed in the legislative history. The format decisions are premised on indi-
vidual public interest determinations in specific renewal or transfer
situations. In this setting, the congressional intent is clear that all radio
licenses should be granted only after it is determined to be in the public
interest. Congress is silent regarding the necessity of individual license pro-
ceedings as a means of regulating entertainment formats in the public inter-
est. Because of this silence, it can be inferred that Congress left to the agency
the means of determining the public interest when conducting an individual
license proceeding.
3. The History of the FCC's Policy of Nonintervention
Finally, it is necessary to examine the history of the FCC's implementa-
tion of the public interest standard. In construing its own enabling statute,
the Commission has consistently adhered to a policy of noninterference with
97. BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN WEB, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES, 22-28 (1968).
98. Radio Communicatton: Hearings on HR. 5589 Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine&
Fihertes, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 5589].
99. The Communications Act of 1934 provides:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any ra-
dio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Com-
mission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
100. See Hearings on HR. 5589, supra note 98, at 39-40. A proposal to allocate 25% of the
radio station broadcast signals to educational, religious, agricultural and similar programming
was defeated since the proposal would establish a preference for some programs over others. 78
CONG. REC. 8843-46 (1934).
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the discretion of broadcasters in selecting and modifying entertainment for-
mats. In En Banc Programming Inquiv,y0 1 in 1960, the Commission reiterated
its position that the "responsibility for the selection and presentation of
broadcast material ultimately devolves upon the individual station licensee,
and that the fulfillment of the public interest requires the free exercise of his
independent judgment."' 1 2 As a result, the Commission's role could not "be
one of program dictation or program supervision."
' 10 3
It was not until after the first format doctrine case that the Commission
departed from this interpretation. Although still giving considerable lati-
tude in the matter of programming, the Commission in its 1971 Primer on
Ascertainment of Community Problems t04 stated that "any application involving
a substantial change in program format . . . will be scrutinized in light of [the
Voice of the Arts in Atlanta] decision. . . ."15 The FCC charged the appli-
cants with the burden of demonstrating that the public interest favored their
proposal to change formats. Additionally, the FCC stated that it would
"take an extra hard look at the reasonableness of any proposal which would
depri a community of its only source of a particular type of program-
ming." 10 6 After the tension between the FCC and the court of appeals over
the reach of the format doctrine, however, the Commission, in the 1976 Pol-
icy Statement, retreated to its original conviction that this approach "was
neither administratively tenable nor necessary in the public interest.""0
7
B. The Commisston's Findings-Providing a Rational Basis for the Use of Free
Competition in Regulating Radio Programming
In the 1976 Policy Statement the FCC rejected the format doctrine on
four grounds: 1) classification of formats; 2) ascertainment of listener inter-
ests; 3) financial viability of the broadcasting station; and 4) first amend-
ment considerations.
1. Classification of Formats
The FCC maintained that classifying musical formats would be highly
subjective because it would involve a unique combination of many elements:
music selection, disc jockey personality, commercials, and news.i08 Al-
though the FCC complained that "radio format idiosyncracies . . . are too
fleeting to be caught in the clumsy nets of legal formulations,"' 0 9 the staff
study did categorize the radio station formats of several cities. The Commis-
sion's argument is specious in light of the framework which the format doc-
trine created. Necessarily, when there is a public outcry, it will be because a
101. 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960).
102. Id at 2308-09.
103. Id
104. 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971).
105. Id at 680.
106. Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223, 231 (1973) (additional views of Chairman
Burch).
107. Policy Statement, supra note 54, at 866 n.8.





format is unique. The ability to classify formats is not an impossible task, as
evidenced by the staff study which placed radio station formats in nineteen
categories.' 1O But as the Commission noted, the final administrative deci-
sion would, by necessity, be subjective. Rather than employ a subjective test
of "[I] know it when [I] hear it,"' I  the Commission reasonably decided to
use the competitive market place to regulate radio station formats.
2. Ascertaining Listener Interests
The Commission established that no feasible method of measuring the
intensity of listener preferences for particular types of programming existed.
With the radio industry changing formats to accommodate perceived
changes in listener demand, the FCC asserted it would face difficulty in
quantifying the different sizes and compositions of markets.' 12 Moreover,
the Commission noted that when a unique format is replaced by another
format, there may be a loss in diversity; however, there may also be an over-
all increase in listener satisfaction since the intensity of public demand for
the replacement format may be greater than the intensity of demand for the
abandoned format. 1 3 Because radio listeners "cannot register their inten-
sity of preference through a price system,"' 14 the FCC was correct in its
position that it is "extremely difficult to compare the intensity of preference
of different persons."' 15
3. Financial Viability
Another reason given by the Commission for rejecting the WEFM test
was the speculation involved in determining a station's financial status.
Under the format doctrine, a format could not be abandoned simply because
it was more profitable to chose another format. Only if the financial losses
were attributable to the unique format could the licensee change the pro-
gramming. The Commission charged this administrative regulation with
creating a purely speculative task based on an inquiry into what the
financial position of the station might be if the format were different.' 16
The court of appeals did not view the format doctrine as administra-
tively impractical, reasoning that administrative agencies have, in the past,
110. Id., app. B at 872-81. The staff report did contain a caveat about the methodology of
ascertaining where each radio format should fit into the designated type of musical or other
entertainment program; it was claimed to be a subjective judgment.
111. Commissioner Robinson applied Justice Stewart's test for determining obscenity to
characterizing the subjectiveness of determining a type of radio format. Id at 594.
112. Policy Statement, supra note 54, at 864.
113. Id at 863.
114. 610 F.2d at 863 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
115. Id
116. In the Policy Statement, supra note 54, the Commission asserted:
In WEFM the Court was careful to note that the relevant financial inquiry was not
whether the station had been financially profitable during the tenure of a particular
format, because financial losses could proceed from a variety of causes [argued the
Court] completely unrelated to the station's program menu. Rather, the relevant in-
quiry is whether the format might hauc been viable. This is, we observe, an almost fan-
tastically speculative point for inquiry, and one not subject to very satisfactory-and
certainly not to incontestable--proof.
Id. at 863 n.6 (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original).
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grappled with difficult factual questions. The appellate court was probably
correct in asserting that the FCC could devise procedures to accommodate a
format change hearing. But the issue was whether the FCC decision-making
process, embodied in the Policy Statement, was arbitrary and capricious.
The Supreme Court correctly ruled that the Commission had provided a
reasonable basis for promoting diversity in entertainment programming
through the competitive marketplace.'
17
4. First Amendment Considerations
Finally, first amendment considerations provide a reasonable basis for
the FCC to shy away from imposing restrictions resembling censorship on
broadcasters. The first amendment right of free speech is applicable to the
broadcast media. Because of the peculiar characteristics of the media,' 11
however, "[iut is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount."'" 9 Broadcasters are, however, still enti-
tled to "the widest journalistic freedom consistent with [their] public obliga-
t;n "120 TUnArt tho- fnrmn-t dnrtrinP, the. hrnadaqtrrq' right tn chnnre. nr
modify their existing programs would be conditional. The risk of losing a
license or having a prescribed format imposed on them would necessarily
"chill" the broadcasters' free speech right.
In CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 12 the Supreme Court held that
the Commission could reasonably balance the gains made by governmental
regulation toward meeting public interest goals against the interference with
the freedom of broadcasters. The Court also permitted the FCC to deter-
mine from the balancing that the price of governmental regulation was too
high. In this case, the Commission made such a determination and decided
that the gains in diversity were outweighed by the disadvantages of govern-
ment intervention in programming decisions.
The Supreme Court in WNCN sided with the Commission and held the
FCC's policy would best preserve the broadcasters' first amendment rights
and still promote the goal of diversity for the listening audience. The Court
noted that while listeners do have certain first amendment rights, the first
amendment does not grant to "individual listeners the right to have the
117. The Court, however, did not stop here. Instead the Court deferred to the Commis-
sion's expertise in any determinations the Commission might make injuturo and concluded that
"[i]f time and changing circumstances reveal that the 'public interest' is not served by applica-
tion of the Regulations, it must be assumed that the Commission will act in accordance with its
statutory obligations." 450 U.S. at 603 (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. at 225). Because this language seems to sanction unknown future actions of the Com-
mission, essentially giving it a carte blanche in questions regarding the public interest, it may be
regarded as mere dictum.
118. See generally Chamberlin, The FCC and the Fist Prnzciple of the Fairness Doctrine.- A Hitor'
of Neglect and Distortion, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 361 (1979); Goldberg & Couzens, "Pecuhiar Characteris-
tics" An Analysis of the First Amendment Implications of Broadcast Regulation, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 1
(1978); Note, FCC Regulation of Broadcast News: First Amendment Peril of Confcting StAndards of
Review, 48 FORDHAm L. REv. 1226 (1980); Note, The Equal Opportunity Doctrine in Political Broad-
casting: Proposed Modiftatitns of the Communications Act of 1934, 12 IND. L. REv. 745 (1979).
119. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
120. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110
(1973).
121. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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Commission review the abandonment of their favorite entertainment
programs."1
22
In the appellate decision in WNCN, Judge Bazelon stated in a concur-
ring opinion: "[the] regulation of entertainment formats is not content neu-
tral. The regulator is inevitably led to favor some forms of expression over
others." 123 By regulating through the marketplace, the Commission reason-
ably avoided a first amendment confrontation.
III. THE AGENCY-JUDICIARY RELATIONSHIP
In recent years, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has become a
vocal advocate for a stricter scrutiny by the judiciary of administrative ac-
tion. In promoting this principle, the appellate court has strayed from the
historical standard of substantial judicial deference to agency decisions. In
WNCN, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this earlier standard of court review.
Although the express holding of WNCN applies to the FCC's free market-
place policy, the reasoning of the opinion has vast implications for the scope
of judicial review of administrative agency rulemaking authority.
A. Informal Rulemaking
The Communications Act of 1934 provides that "the Commission from
time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires shall . . .
[s]tudy new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies, and
generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public
interest."
124
Under this directive, the FCC has the authority to devise and imple-
ment these public interest goals. Pursuant to this authority, the Commission
issued the Policy Statement on the deregulation of entertainment formats
through the dictates of the competitive marketplace. In promulgating the
Policy Statement, the FCC followed the informal rulemaking procedure as
set out in section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 125 The
APA informal rulemaking procedure provides for a simple quasi-legislative
process. The agency initially develops a proposed policy (or rule) 126 which is
then published as a notice in the Federal Register, inviting comments from
all interested persons. The agency may also have hearings and other proce-
dures to further develop the policy. The agency must provide reasonable
time deadlines for comments and institute public hearings if it is necessary to
ensure that interested parties have an "opportunity to be heard and to par-
122. 450 U.S. at 604.
123. Judge Bazelon noted "that there is [not] a simple resolution to the conflict between
fostering diversity, on the one hand, and protecting the media from chilling government inter-
ference on the other." Id.
124. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). For a thorough discussion on informal
rulemaking, see DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and tac Integration of Law and Poblt, 65 VA. L. REV.
257 (1979).
126. The APA defines a rule as "an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement . . . law or policy .... " 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976).
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ticipate in a meaningful way."'1 27 In addition, the agency can evaluate any
sources of information that are pertinent to a reasoned decision.' 2 8 Finally,
the agency will fashion the final policy and publish it in the Federal Regis-
ter. A concise statement of the reason and basis for the agency's action must
be published with the policy. 129 The agency may, however, by relying on its
expert knowledge and experience, ground its final decision on future predic-
tions of how the policy goals will be accomplished.
130
B. Scope ofJudaial Review
An administrative policy statement is reviewable by the court of appeals
pursuant to the APA. Section 706 of the APA sets out the criteria a court
should employ when reviewing an administrative decision issued under the
informal rulemaking process. This section requires the court to "decide all
relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provi-
sions . . ,,31 The court will uphold the agency rule unless it finds that
the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or in excess of its statutory authority or
WILIIUUL UlYVL: U_ vKuuRc Ac4u1Ku U_ law., -
As a result of this broad language, the proper scope of judicial review
has been given different interpretations.1 33 One viewpoint is that agency
action is to be accorded vast judicial deference whenever the agency has
advanced a reason for its decision. The basis for this judicial deference is
that Congress has delegated to the agency the responsibility of implementing
the goals of its enabling statute. Since the agency has the expertise and ex-
perience to make a rational decision, a reviewing court should not disturb
administrative action as long as the agency's decision is not arbitrary or ca-
pricious. Another viewpoint holds that a court reviewing an agency's deci-
sion based on statutory construction or proper procedure may style its own
independent judgment. This departure from the judicial deference tenet is
rationalized by the concept that "the courts are the final authorities on issues
of statutory construction."' 3 4 Advocacy of this more rigorous standard of
127. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 541 (1978).
128. The court of appeals' decision in WNCN upbraided the FCC for not publishing for pre-
decisional comment a staff paper compiling certain publicly available data. However, neither
the due process clause nor the APA require pre-decision disclosure in rulemaking proceeding of
staff memoranda. &.e Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 547 (1978); sergeneral~ly Wilson v. Zuckerman, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
RULEMAKING PROCEDURE, 1979 Ann. Survy of Am. L. 393.
129. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
130. Id.
131. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
132. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1976). The courts employ the substantial evidence standard
when reviewing administrative decisions based on adjudicatory proceedings.
133. Gifford, Adminirtrai'oe Rulemaking andluditcial Reviiw: Some Conceptual Model, 65 MINN.
L. REV. 63 (1980); Hubbard, Patterns of judt'al Review ofAdminirtratie Deciutns, 12 U. TOL. L.
REV. 37 (1980).
134. These two positions are exemplified in the concurring opinions in WNCN. Judge
Leventhal advocates a hard look at agency's decisions. His view of the relationship between the
administrative and judicial functions is one of a partnership-type status. Thus, "[tjhe court is in
a real sense part of the administrative process .. " and by implication, affords administrative
actions less judicial deference. 610 F.2d at 859 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
Judge Bazelon, however, reasons that judicial review should correct only the most egre-
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review was the crux of the controversy in WNCN.' 35
The court of appeals in deciding the format cases and in vacating the
Policy Statement employed a more rigorous judicial scrutiny of the FCC's
administrative decision-making. Judge McGowan, who authored both
WEFM and WNCN, set out the method of judicial review that the appellate
courts use in scrutinizing administrative decisions.' 36 He characterized the
scope of review as possessing three levels of judicial scrutiny, with the inten-
sity of the scrutiny dependent upon the basis for the administrative decision.
Judge McGowan stated that the reviewing court will use the least in-
tense level of review when the administrative decision involves an interpreta-
tion of purely technical or scientific facts before the agency. In this situation,
with "the 'obvious limitations upon the capacity of courts to deal meaning-
fully' with such areas of knowledge," the "court should consider itself under
the greatest measure of restraint in disturbing agency action."'
137
A middle level of judicial scrutiny, Judge McGowan maintained, is ap-
propriate when the court is examining an alleged error in statutory interpre-
tation. Although courts will take into account the construction of the statute
by the agency, "[t]hat deference . . . is strictly limited."' 38 Judge Mc-
Gowan insisted that "[tihe reach and meaning of an act of Congress is for
the courts to decide in the last analysis, and it is a judicial responsibility not
to be abdicated."'
39
Judge McGowan asserted that an examination of procedural fairness in
the agency's actions prompts a court to use the most intense level of scrutiny.
Due to the courts' expertise with due process clauses, Judge McGowan
opined that the courts have judicial discretion to decide what is "procedural
fair play and effective truth ascertainment." 4"
The court of appeals specifically found in WNCN that the Commission's
action in issuing the Policy Statement was arbitrary and capricious 14 1 and
that it exceeded the Commission's statutory authority.' 42 The appellate
court stated that since these two grounds were so compelling, it need not rule
on the procedural fairness of the Commission's failure to release a staff
study.143 The Supreme Court, however, in overruling the court of appeals,
upheld the Policy Statement since there was a rational basis for it. ' 4 4 The
differences between these two divergent opinions revolve around the right of
the agency to formulate substantive policies and on the proper scope ofjudi-
gious abuses. He noted that "[i]mplementing the public interest standard calls for a strong dose
of policy judgment, a responsibility entrusted by Congress to the FCC." Id. at 858 (Bazelon, J.,
concurring). Judge Bazelon stated that the majority in WNCN had reduced the FCC's job to a
"spectator's role." He concluded that the Commission should be permitted "to cast its lot with
the marketplace." Id. at 858-59 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
135. See note 134 supra.
136. McGowan, Reftections on Rulemaking Review, 53 TUL. L. REV. 681 (1979).1




141. 610 F.2d at 850-52.
142. Id at 854-55.
143. Id at 847 n.24.
144. 450 U.S. at 595-96.
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cial review of agency action. The issue in controversy was, who is entitled to
decide the direction of administrative policies?
14 5
The Supreme Court's decision in WNCN, affirming the judicial defer-
ence principle, is consistent with another recent Supreme Court case. In FCC
v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,146 the Supreme Court over-
turned a District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision and affirmed the
FCC's authority to provide a "grandfather" exception to the broadcaster-
newspaper owner policy. This policy limited the amount of co-ownership in
broadcasting stations and newspapers that any individual, partnership, or
corporation could have. In permitting the Commission to pursue its policy
of prospective divestiture of commonly owned broadcasting stations and
newspapers, the Court characterized the Commission's action as a proper
judgment determination: "In such circumstances, complete factual support
in the record for the Commission's judgment or prediction is not possible or
required; 'a forecast of the direction in which the public interest lies neces-
sarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency.' "147
.n8 f-AAhinin V S.. tatcmft, . FCC',. .. iade sn IIsuas Juuguscilt
predictions. The court of appeals in the format doctrine decisions usurped
the Commission's discretion to decide administrative policy and substituted
its own views for what the proper policy should be. Previously, the court of
appeals had disapproved of courts legislating administrative policy. In
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,14 8 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals profiled the agency-judiciary relationship, noting that the courts
should not overstep their boundaries in administrative review. The appel-
late court acknowledged that an agency "has latitude not merely to find
facts and make judgments, but also to select the policies deemed in the pub-
lic interest. The function of the court is to assure that the agency has given
reasoned consideration to all the material facts and issues." 1 49 Once the
court ascertains that the administrative decision is proper, "the court exer-
cises restraint and affirms the agency's action even though the court would
on its own account have made different findings or adopted different
standards."1
50
In WNCN, the Supreme Court employed the same judicial restraint as
did the court in Greater Boston. In contrast to Judge McGowan's analysis, the
Supreme Court in WNCN rejected the use of a more rigorous standard of
145. One commentator has viewed the court of appeals' format decisions as that court's own
interpretation of the Communications Act statute:
The cases are extraordinary illustrations of a court willing to expand its own function
at the expense of the agency's discretion, to make remote inferences of the policy from
amorphous and general statutory language, and to go beyond mere oversight of the
agency's work product to an extended collaborative dialogue with the Commission
over what its substantive policies ought to be.
Polsby, FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting and the Judicious Uses of Ad-
ministrative Discretion, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 17.
146. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
147. Id at 814 (quoting FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29
(1961)).
148. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).




judicial review of an agency's action when that action is based on statutory
interpretation or a procedural fairness question. Instead, the Court used a
rational basis test, the statutory "arbitrary and capricious" standard, in af-
firming the administrative action of formulating the Policy Statement. 15 1
The APA, in providing for judicial review, 152 does not offer more than a
broad statement of criteria for the courts to employ in reviewing administra-
tive action. Manifestly, the gloss that the Supreme Court places on the con-
struction of the APA statutory standards is important for future court
decisions.
IV. DEREGULATION OF NONENTERTAINMENT PROGRAMMING
A. The 1981 Deregulation of Radio Rule
The FCC's deregulation of radio content did not stop, however, with
the entertainment portions. On February 24, 1981, the Commission promul-
gated a final rule in which certain nonentertainment portions of radio
broadcasting were also deregulated. The areas of programming affected
were: (1) the nonentertainment programming guideline; (2) the ascertain-
ment primer; (3) the commercial guideline; and (4) the program logs. Essen-
tially, under the Deregulation Policy Statement, 15 3 the radio licensee is no
longer required to comply with strict government formalities in those four
areas, only generalized public interest obligations "in light of the contempo-
rary reality of the radio marketplace."'
54
1. Nonentertainment Guideline
Nonentertainment programming consists of news, public affairs, and
other general items of a public interest nature. The original guideline had
been instituted to ensure that the listening public would be well informed on
current, significant issues affecting the community. Before the 1981 Deregu-
lation Rule, 155 the guideline' 56 specified that AM stations should devote
eight percent, and FM stations six percent, of their air time to nonentertain-
ment programming. If the licensees complied with this guideline, their re-
newal applications were routinely processed and their licenses re-issued.'
5 7
The new rule that replaced the guideline still obligates the broadcasters
to offer issues of concern to the community, but it is designed to "assure that
broadcasters will have the maximum flexibility to be responsive to issues im-
151. The Court cited the APA "arbitrary and capricious" standard, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)
(1976), and then observed "that a reviewing court applying this standard 'is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.' " 450 U.S. at 594 n.30 (quoting Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
152. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
153. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888 (1981).
154. Id. at 13,888.
155. The Commission received over 20,000 comments following notice of the proposed de-
regulation rule. Classifying the "formal" comments, the Commission found about half of the
comments to be in favor of the deregulation and about half of them opposed to it. 46 Fed. Reg.
13,888, 13,889 (1981) (to be codified in 47 CFR pts. 0 & 73).
156. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888, 13,890 (1981).
157. Id. at 13,890.
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portant to their listeners, with the minimum amount of governmental inter-
ference."' 58 Thus, broadcasters, in determining what community needs to
address, can also consider the preferences of their listening audience and
"the services provided by other radio stations in the community to groups
other than its own listenership."' 159 No specified amount of time now needs
to be devoted to nonentertainment programming in order to meet the public
interest standard. Instead, the Commission, in determining if the broad-
caster has complied with the standard, will examine "whether the chal-
lenged licensee acted reasonably in choosing which issues to address.'
'1 60
2. Ascertainment
Ascertainment is the formal procedure which broadcasters use to dis-
cover the community issues so that programs can be broadcast to examine
these issues. The Commission stated that the procedure "was never intended
to be an end in and of itself. Rather, it is merely a tool to be used as an aid
in the provision of programming responsive to the needs and problems of the
community. ; Thus, iicensees are nu ,uilsuc ici.t,,i ,,l t , ...... ' .....-
ment's detailed ascertainment procedure. Broadcasters can now "determine
the issues in their community that warrant consideration and may do so by
any reasonable means."' 62 The rationale given for the deregulation of the
ascertainment procedure was the number of radio stations providing well-
balanced programming directed to community issues. The market forces,
the Commission maintained, would ensure that this programming continues.
The general criterion that the FCC will use in determining if licensees have
met their public interest obligation is the licensees' "good faith discretion" to




Before the deregulation action, broadcasters could air a maximum of
eighteen minutes of commercials per hour. 164 'Expressing its concern that
"advertising not become the superseding force in broadcast service and pro-
gramming,"' 65 the FCC nonetheless eliminated all of the policies concerning
the amount of commercial time. The Commission again relied on the "mar-
ketplace forces to regulate levels of commercialization."' 66 In addition, the
FCC noted that most broadcasters, even before the deregulation, generally
158. Id at 13,891.
159. Id. at 13,892. The Commission also stated that stations serving smaller communities
may have to provide a more general type of public interest program than stations in larger
areas. The Commission not only found that this was a part of the licensees' general obligation
to serve the public interest, but that it also made good business sense. Id.
160. Id. at 13,897.
161. IM
162. Id
163. Id at 13,899.





aired less than the maximum limit.'
6 7
The FCC predicted that reliance on the marketplace would work for
two reasons. First, the Commission postulated that "stations with commer-
cial excesses are attractive neither to listeners nor to advertisers."' 68 The
listening public will not listen to a station that is overloaded with commer-
cials and the advertisers will seek a station where their commercials do not
get lost in the "clutter" of other ads.' 69 Second, the Commission proposed
that with the elimination of the commercial time limit, broadcasters might




A programming log is a comprehensive record detailing "the level and
timing of programming for every specified program type.' 7 ' Each licensee
was previously required to keep a program log and make it available for
public inspection. The deregulation action adopted for programming logs
eliminates the requirement of formalized government forms and record
keeping. Broadcasters are still required to maintain all other public files
containing relevant programming information. These public records are
still required to be available for public perusal and inspection. The Com-
mission supported this deregulation because of data indicating that the for-
mal record logs were a costly burden to the broadcaster. 172 Furthermore,
the Commission noted the dissatisfaction of many commentators because
these logs did not contain "useful information considering their pervasive
and complex nature."' 73 Hence, the FCC discerned that the informal pub-
lic records provided a better method of informing the public of a station's
nonentertainment programming.
B. The Future Efect of the 1981 Deregulation Rule on Judicial Review
The Commission asserted that this deregulation rule will "reduce the
paperwork and other burdens on commercial radio stations without having a
substantial adverse impact upon the public interest." ' 74 The Commission
also contended that broadcasters must still be responsive to the needs of their
167. Id at 13,901.
168. Id at 13,902.
169. Id The Commission predicted that "[s]tations with excessive commercials will often
find themselves with smaller audiences and fewer advertisers."
170. Id at 13,903.
171. Id.
172. Supporting its rationale that the programming logs were excessively burdensome, the
Commission cited a General Accounting Office report that found that "the logging rules for
AM and FM stations require a total of 18,233,940 hours per year by the industry." Id. at
13,904. The data was contained in Federal Papetrwork Its Impact on Small Business, General Ac-
counting Office, November 17, 1978, at 43 n.87.
173. 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,903.
174. Id at 13,888. One commentator has charged that the deregulation action violated the
FCC's statutory authority. See Note, The FCC's Proposal to Deregulate Radio: Is it Permissible Under
the Communcations Act of 1931?, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 233 (1980). See generally Note, The Proposed




listening public, but that the deregulation will give the broadcasters more
flexibility in meeting those needs. The problem with the deregulation rule is
that there is now a degree of uncertainty concerning the requisite quantum
of good faith effort the FCC will expect from the broadcasters. 175 Assuming,
however, that the broadcasters do make a good faith effort, this deregulation
rule creates an almost irrebuttable presumption that the nonentertainment
programming the broadcasters air will meet the public interest standard.
Moreover, this reliance on the market forces and-on the reasonableness of the
broadcatsers places a very high burden on citizens' groups to prove that a
licensee is not broadcasting in the public interest.
These problems with the nonentertainment deregulation rule, however,
probably do not constitute sufficient cause to set it aside. The Supreme
Court's decision in WNCN is instructive of how the Court will review the
Commission's 1981 deregulation decision. The FCC's substitution of compe-
tition for regulation in the public interest does not violate the Communica-
tions Act under the rationale espoused in WNCN. The Commission's recent
implementation of the nonentertainment deregulation standard, if based on
sufficient reasoning, will be upheld by the courts. After the Supreme Court's
admonishment in WNCN, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals will
probably refrain from either vacating the new rule or imposing additional
procedures for the broadcasters to follow.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in WNCN reduced the broad judicial role in the
administrative process. The Court's discussion of the proper relationship be-
tween the judicial and administrative authorities led to the conclusion that
the judiciary's role was one of a benign overseer. The redefining of the judi-
ciary's role in reviewing administrative decisions can be traced to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council Inc. 176 In Vermont Yankee, the Court stated that the
court of appeals "fundamentally misconceives the nature of the standard of
review for an agency rule" and had engaged in "Monday morning
quarterbacking."177 In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,178
the Court further elaborated on the relationship between the FCC and the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and held that "the weighing of poli-
cies under the 'public interest' standard is a task that Congress has delegated
to the Commission in the first instance."' 79 The agency's decision was,
therefore, entitled to judicial deference. Finally, in WNCN, the Supreme
Court declared that the Commission's reliance on a competitive marketplace
to further the public interest in diverse programming had a rational basis
and was entitled to judicial deference.
175. "What do we mean by 'a generalized obligation'? That is not at all clear from our
document." 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,950.
176. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
177. Id at 547.
178. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
179. Id. at 810.
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More importantly, the Supreme Court adhered to the APA's standard
of judicial review, the "arbitrary and capricious" test, in deciding that the
agency's decision was reasonable. The Court did not differentiate or impose
a different level of scrutiny for reviewing agency decisions which are based
on facts or on statutory construction. The potential reach of WNCN on the
agency-judicial relationships will necessarily be gauged by the appellate
court's acquiescence with the Supreme Court's advocacy of judicial defer-
ence. Moreover, the WNCN decision has essentially provided administrative
agencies with greater authority in guiding future policy. Although that au-
thority may have always existed, the reviewing court has often kept the
agency from fully exercising it.
Based on this analysis, the promulation of the FCC's 1981 Deregulation
Rule undoubtedly will be considered to be a proper exercise of administra-
tive authority. The deregulation of both the entertainment and
nonentertainment portions of radio programming has relieved broadcasters
of many burdensome government requirements. Radio broadcasters have
not been totally freed from governmental regulation, nor should they be.
The Communications Act still mandates that the broadcasters provide for
the public interest as a condition to obtaining a license grant. But the
Supreme Court's decision in WNCN, upholding the FCC's new policy of de-
regulation by reliance on the competitive marketplace, has to a certain de-
gree, liberated radio broadcasting.
Holli L. Baker
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